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Abstract 
 
The roots of today’s ecological crises are the economic and political incentive structures 
which drive unsustainable environmental degradation. In order to control environmental 
destruction, states must cooperate to alter these incentive structures.  However, successful 
international environmental treaties challenge state sovereignty and must overcome scientific 
uncertainty, unique participation and enforcement challenges, and two-level games, doing so 
within the global political landscape, a landscape characterized by a bitter schism between the 
“developed” countries of the “North” and the “developing” countries of the “South.”  Extreme 
asymmetries of power, pollution, and living standards, as well as dueling ideologies, complicate 
such cooperation.  Using the Rational Design framework, this study shows key design 
differences in the centralization of compliance monitoring and mandating domestic legislation 
within international agreements between exclusively “Northern” countries and agreements with 
both “Northern” and “Southern” countries, making a compelling case for the importance of 
future research on the North/South divide.  
 2
Table of Contents 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 4 
THE ROOTS OF THE CRISES: GLOBAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES .............................................................................. 4 
GOVERNING THE (GLOBAL) COMMONS .................................................................................................................... 6 
THE GREAT DIVIDE: NORTH AND SOUTH ................................................................................................................ 7 
THEORY .................................................................................................................................................................... 9 
WHY ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES DESERVE SPECIAL ATTENTION ....................................................................... 11 
Special Considerations for Sovereignty ...................................................................................................... 11 
Scientific Uncertainty ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
Unique Participation and Enforcement Challenges .................................................................................. 14 
Two-Level Games............................................................................................................................................ 17 
WHY THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE DESERVES SPECIAL ATTENTION ...................................................................... 22 
Extreme Asymmetry of Power, Pollution and Living Standards ............................................................ 22 
Dueling Ideologies .......................................................................................................................................... 25 
HYPOTHESES ....................................................................................................................................................... 27 
METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................................................. 31 
DEFINING THE NORTH/SOUTH DISTINCTION ....................................................................................................... 32 
RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................................. 36 
Hypothesis 1: South/South Agreements ...................................................................................................... 36 
Hypothesis 2: Flexibility ................................................................................................................................ 36 
Hypothesis 3: Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 41 
Hypothesis 4: Inducements to Compliance ................................................................................................ 42 
Hypothesis 5: Monitoring ............................................................................................................................. 43 
Hypothesis 6: Non-state Actors .................................................................................................................... 46 
Hypothesis 7: Membership ............................................................................................................................ 47 
Descriptive Questions ..................................................................................................................................... 48 
DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 49 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................................................. 51 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ....................................................................................................................................... 53 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................ 54 
APPENDIX:  TREATY SAMPLE AND CLASSIFICATIONS ................................................................... 58 
 3
Introduction 
 
“Compare the planet’s resources to a large sum of money which pays interest.  If you live on the interest 
alone, the capital stays intact, and you can live well indefinitely.  This interest is our available 
environmental space.  On the other hand, if you use even a small part of the capital each year as well as 
the interest, the end will come surprisingly fast.  After all, because of a decrease in the capital, the annual 
interest will also decrease at an increasing rate.  One will therefore eat faster and faster into the capital.  
This is the foolish way we are living now.”1 
 
At the turn of the millennium, the human race has reached a unique point in its history 
when confronting local, regional, and global environmental challenges has become unavoidable.  
Once environmental concerns were the talk of the elite, but now even popular culture is infused 
with references to global climate change, and bored office workers are discussing it around the 
water cooler.  For the first time, it is possible to envision, in the near future, a human impact on 
the planet great enough to decimate Earth as we know it.  Legitimate questions have been raised 
about future generations’ ability to survive on a planet with resources that have been or are 
projected to be depleted or denigrated beyond the Earth’s ability to regenerate them.  Scientific 
investigations of environmental concerns such as climate change, air and water pollution, soil 
depletion, and chemical bioaccumulation have led to scientific questions about future 
generations’ ability to survive on this planet if substantive action is not soon taken.2 
The Roots of the Crises: Global Incentive Structures 
Yet no substantive action to confront the world’s growing environmental problems will 
be successful without addressing their underlying cause—a cause that is not simply ecological in 
nature, but rather fundamentally organizational: destructive ecological management.  This 
destructive management is a product of the global incentive structures that motivate actors—
                                                 
1 Carley and Spapens 1998, 50. 
2 Ibid., 1-27. 
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from the micro level of individual people and families to the macro level of states, international 
organizations, multinational corporations and other global organizations—to use natural 
resources in an unsustainable way. 
The foundation of these incentive structures can be found in the current international 
organization of sovereign states, which has sliced an intricate, complex, and interdependent 
global ecosystem into a patchwork of territories with different ecological “managers,” creating 
essentially a prisoner’s dilemma with almost two hundred actors.  The existing state boundaries 
are also often illogical with respect to the prudent management or preservation of the Earth’s 
natural resources.  This situation is compounded by the incentive structure added by global 
capitalism, which, while requiring natural resources as inputs and raw materials, currently 
ignores or severely undervalues “ecological capital” and “ecological expenditure,” making 
environmental degradation and the production of externalities, for most intents and purposes, 
“free.”  Further aggravating the problem, economic discount rates, an important tool in economic 
cost-benefit analysis, severely discount the value of the future, and in doing so, devalue future 
environmental resources and the true cost of current environmental degradation.3  This neglect of 
important ecological concerns on the part of economists was epitomized in the controversial 
statement by one American economist, who stated that the effects of global warming on the 
United States economy would be negligible, since agriculture was only three percent of the 
United States gross national product.4 
Another significant factor contributing to our global environmental crises is the extreme 
inequality between the world’s rich and poor.  Both the world’s affluence and the world’s 
poverty are causes of environmental degradation.  The rich, industrialized countries of the world 
                                                 
3 Davidson 2000, 61-80. 
4 Davidson 2000, 7. 
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consume goods and resources at an unsustainable rate: consumption since 1950 has been 
estimated to be equal to the consumption of all previous human history.5  On the other end of the 
spectrum, “poverty itself pollutes.” 6  When individuals and communities do not have another 
option, degrading the environment is many times the only possibility to survive.  This excessive 
exploitation for survival is a vicious cycle, for as land and other resources become worse and 
worse, the people using them can reap fewer and fewer resources, forcing them to find more land 
and unexploited resources. 7 8  This effect is especially present in rainforest destruction. 9   
Governing the (Global) Commons 
What can be done to correct such pervasive and self-destructive incentive structures? 
Felipe Gonzalez, a pivotal former president of Spain, once said that the management of public 
spaces is the role of the government.  Indeed, in a parallel domestic situation, the government 
could step in to alter the “price structure” of resource usage, until the real costs of 
environmentally damaging actions were enough to lead to an ecologically optimal outcome, or 
zone and regulate land use and other environmental resources.  Yet the Earth and its atmosphere 
are a public space that lack a central government with the power to manage and coordinate 
resource use, and each state operating within its own self-interest economically creates negative 
externalities for all states.  Furthermore, it is clear that as long as such self-destructing incentive 
structures are in place, it is reasonable to expect the current unsustainable rate of environmental 
degradation to continue, presumably until there are no more resources to be had. 
                                                 
5 Carley and Spapens 1998, 3. 
6 French 2005, 15. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
8 Vandermeer and Perfecto 2005. 
9 Ibid. 
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Thankfully, while the organizational challenge of governing a global common space with 
almost two hundred individual managers is daunting, states do have an incentive to cooperate—
many times the true difficulty is surmounting the various barriers to international environmental 
cooperation.  Historically, the organizational solution to international cooperation problems has 
been the international institution, defined by Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal in The Rational 
Design of International Institutions as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international 
actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.”10  As Mitchell and Keilbach state in 
their Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion and Exchange, 
published in The Rational Design of International Institutions, “States create international 
institutions in attempts to resolve problems they cannot solve alone.”11  In this way, cooperation 
under anarchy is possible.  
The Great Divide: North and South 
Yet while the environmental challenges of the day are certainly problems that states 
cannot solve alone, the barriers to environmental cooperation are particularly difficult because 
they are entrenched in the global political landscape, and often inextricably linked with other 
issues such as development and international trade.  In fact, the great economic inequality 
throughout the world that is so much part of the problem of environmental destruction is also a 
critical barrier to its solution, and any international effort to confront environmental destruction 
or tackle global environmental issues, such as climate change, must do so within the context of 
the current global political landscape: a landscape characterized by a bitter and growing schism 
                                                 
10 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 2. 
11 Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 131. 
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between non-industrialized or newly industrializing poorer countries in the global “South” and 
the wealthy industrialized countries of the global “North.”  
 It is important to emphasize, as so many others who have struggled with such imprecise 
terminology, that “the North” and “the South” are not geographic terms, but rather extreme 
simplifications of the global political landscape used to facilitate a discussion about two distinct 
interest groups.  These terms obscure significant differences in culture, geographic and 
ecological regions, history, philosophy and religion between both countries of the “North” and of 
the “South” in order to reduce the problem of global negotiations to its deepest and most 
impacted schisms.  Thus, to be a country in the “North” does not denote to be a country north of 
the equator, or vice versa; Australia, for example, is a “Northern” country in terms of its political 
interests.  However, I will use these terms in place of the terms “developed” and “developing” 
because I find those terms to be more misleading: the term “developed” implies a state of 
completion, while “developing” implies a work in progress.  As will be apparent, both sets of 
countries inflict unsustainable environmental damage to the planet. 
 However, in spite of the limitations of these terms, it is possible to say that Northern 
countries and Southern countries have very different goals and concerns that inform and shape 
their interpretation of environmental challenges and how the international community should 
respond, especially on such globally relevant issues such as climate change.  Furthermore, these 
two loosely defined interest groups have opposing economic, political, and ideological interests 
that complicate cooperation immensely.  Given the great divide in interests and goals between 
countries of the North and countries of the South, how is global environmental cooperation even 
possible?   
 8
The research of the Rational Design projects seeks to analyze how states overcome or 
work around barriers to cooperation through the design of international agreements, and, in that 
spirit, I will analyze a random sample of environmental agreements in an attempt to answer an 
important question:  Are the design features of agreements that have not had to bridge the 
North/South divide different from those that have?  The answer to this question is significant 
because it could lay the foundation for further research on the effectiveness of varying 
environmental institutional designs, as more and more environmental issues require global 
cooperation. 
Theory 
Rational Design takes the perspective that international institutions are neither simply 
norm-establishing entities—although they do play an important role in disputing and 
disseminating international norms—nor simply reflections of state power.12  Rather, according to 
Rational Design theory, “states use international institutions to further their own goals.” 13  
Rational Design theory is based on four underlying assumptions: 1) international actors 
are self-interested and design institutions deliberately to advance joint interests with other actors, 
2) the shadow of the future—the probability of repeated interaction between actors—is great 
enough that the potential for cooperation under anarchy exists, 3) it is costly for states to 
establish and participate in international agreements, and 4) states are risk-averse.14   
Accepting these assumptions as true, the analytic strategy of the Rational Design project 
is to “treat institutions as rational, negotiated responses to the problems international actors 
                                                 
12 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 2. 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Ibid., 21-22. 
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face.”15  Furthermore, while cooperation may be both possible and desirable, in many cases more 
than one possible cooperative solution exists to any given international challenge.   Since each 
state wants to maximize its gains from cooperation, the states involved must “fight over 
institutional design because it affects outcomes.”16   
Because institutional design affects outcomes, the Rational Design project asserts that the 
vast heterogeneity of design differences that exist among international agreements must not be 
random—rather, these design differences are “systematic and sophisticated.”17 
With this analytic lens, the Rational Design project presents conjectures linking barriers 
to cooperation, called cooperation problems, to specific design features of agreements.  By 
analyzing cooperation problems such as problems of distribution, enforcement, the number of 
actors involved, and different types of uncertainty as independent variables, the Rational Design 
framework attempts to explain variations in institutions’ rules for membership, the scope of the 
issues they cover, the degree to which they centralize tasks, their rules for controlling the 
institution, and the flexibility of their arrangements.  These five dimensions are key issues for 
negotiators and analysts alike.18 
 This analysis is especially important for the study of international relations, especially 
since, as James Morrow points out, “institutions influence a states judgment of how it should use 
its power to pursue its interests; different institutions could produce different patterns of 
behavior.”19 
                                                 
15 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 2. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Koremenos 2005, 549. 
18 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 8-13. 
19 Morrow 2001, 231. 
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 In this study, I will strive to apply the Rational Design framework in order to examine the 
effects of the North/South divide on the design of international environmental treaties.  The 
reasons this particular topic deserves special attention are outlined below. 
Why Environmental Treaties Deserve Special Attention 
 One of the goals of the Rational Design framework is to “explain phenomena across a 
range of substantive issues,” including security, economics, the environment, and human 
rights.20  Yet in one essay evaluating the framework, James Morrow stated that the framework 
“needs to attend more carefully to variations of strategic dynamics of different issues.”  He 
continued, “carefully considering the problems each issue poses is necessary to determine what 
institutions we should expect in that area.”21  The environmental issue area is one such area th
deserves special attention because it has unique strategic cha
at 
llenges. 
                                                
Special Considerations for Sovereignty 
As Schwabach explains, “Natural systems are not constrained by national boundaries; if 
they are to be protected, they must be protected internationally, which requires cooperation and 
some sacrifice of sovereignty by the countries concerned.”22  Yet while all international 
agreements require some limitation of state sovereignty, environmental agreements go further in 
the extent that they limit sovereignty because they often attempt to limit states use of natural 
resources, which are many times a key source of power and influence.  Furthermore, they limit 
sovereignty “in the extent to which they regulate domestic activities.  That is, IEAs [International 
Environmental Agreements] do not concern solely those national activities whose impacts fall 
 
20 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 36. 
21 Morrow 2001, 231. 
22 Schwabach 2006, xiii. 
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wholly upon international resources.  They are addressed fundamentally to the regulation of all 
national activities that have any impact on global interests.”23  In fact, Schwabach argues that 
because international agreements offering “one-time solutions” to environmental problems were 
unsuccessful in attracting the needed participants because they required states to “sign away” too 
many sovereign rights at once.24  These political difficulties made the example of the Antarctic 
Treaty system, what is now thought of as the framework-plus-protocol approach, more 
attractive.25  In this approach, states first simply agree to attempt to cooperate, leaving out 
specific details of that cooperation, and then follow that original “framework” agreement with 
protocols and other implementation agreements later.  The current international work to address 
climate change is an example of this style of environmental cooperation: after agreeing to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, states attempted to implement its 
goals through the Kyoto Protocol and other bilateral agreements.  This approach is more 
sensitive to the special issues of sovereignty involved in international environmental agreements. 
Scientific Uncertainty 
According to Schwabach, another reason that states have been reluctant to sign “one-time 
solution” agreements, instead of the agreeing to agree and following up with later 
implementation agreements was the presence uncertainty: uncertainty about the physical 
dimensions of the problem, uncertainty about technological advances, and uncertainty about 
changes in producer and consumer behavior.26  Within the Rational Design framework, these 
types of uncertainty are characterized as “uncertainty about the state of the world:” uncertainty 
that could significantly affect the distribution of costs and benefits to cooperation for each state 
                                                 
23 Swanson and Johnston 1999, 90. 
24 Schwabach 2006, 28-29. 
25 Schwabach 2006, 29. 
26 Schwabach 2006, 28-29. 
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involved, yet cannot be fully known at the time of the agreement.  Within the realm of 
environmental agreements, however “uncertainty about the state of the world” is often at least 
partially due to scientific uncertainty about environmental processes and effects.  This is 
important because to a certain extent, unlike other types of uncertainty, such as the uncertainty 
surrounding the future actions of other states, this uncertainty can be at least partially resolved 
through scientific research and investigation.   
Because in many cases when scientific uncertainty exists it adds to uncertainty about the 
state of the world, risk-averse states must design their agreements accordingly, but be prepared to 
adapt as more information becomes available.  For this reason, scientific uncertainty can be used 
as a political stalling tool.  The example of climate change is a good example of this.  Although 
currently much information exists about the effects of climate change and the role of human 
activity, still there is uncertainty about the speed, intensity, and distribution of the effects of 
climate change. 27  Some negotiators are able to use this fact to delay an agreement until more 
information is available.  Since some degree of scientific uncertainty is almost always present 
within environmental agreements, such a stalling tool can be effective for a long time.  
Furthermore, it is possible that more information about environmental issues could only deepen 
and complicate existing barriers to cooperation.  Using climate change again as an example, 
more information about the distribution of the effects of climate change could severely aggravate 
the already severe distribution problems between states, as each state discovered that it would 
benefit, lose, or be unaffected by climate changes.  In this case, scientific uncertainty might be a 
significant aid to cooperation, but some states, especially those who would have to bear the 
majority of the costs of the agreement—in this case the states of the North—have an incentive to 
press for answers the scientific answers before initiating cooperation.  For these reasons, 
                                                 
27 Jurgielewicz 1996, 132-133. 
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scientific uncertainty within environmental agreements presents another unique strategic 
challenge to cooperation. 
Unique Participation and Enforcement Challenges 
 Environmental treaties are faced with unique challenges to participation.  One challenge 
to participation is common to all public goods problems: the problem of the free rider.  With the 
example of climate change, if one country, or group of countries, pays to try and control global 
climate change, the entire world will benefit from this action.  Therefore, no country wants to be 
the one to take action and bear the costs of that action—thus, all actors have an incentive to wait 
for another actor to take action. 28  If left unaltered, this situation structure will lead to an 
equilibrium outcome where no one takes action and the public good is not provided or the 
environmental challenge remains unsolved.  Therefore, to induce participation in environmental 
treaties attempting to provide public goods, like controlling climate change, states must create or 
alter incentives to participate. 
 Another participation problem facing many environmental treaties attempting to resolve 
global problems is that although a successful treaty may require the participation of many if not 
all states, multilateral negotiations are not only complicated, but they often impair substantive 
action by diluting the terms and obligations of the treaty.  As Swanson and Johnston describe the 
phenomenon, “the irony of the situation is that the solution of the problem requires agreement, 
but agreement seems to require that the problem go unsolved.”29  Furthermore, because these 
treaties are multilateral and not bilateral, all the countries have an incentive to wait to be the last 
to sign and ratify it, thus delaying the time when they must assume the costs of participation. 30  
                                                 
28 Swanson and Johnston 1999, 139. 
29 Swanson and Johnston 1999, 93. 
30 Ibid., 139. 
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 Yet even outside the realm of global or even large multilateral agreements, the nuances of 
the problem of environmental externalities pose significant challenges to agreement 
participation.  In the case of externalities, these participation challenges are intertwined with 
special enforcement challenges.  Ron Mitchell and Patricia Keilbach address this issue in their 
article, Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion and Exchange.  In 
this article, Mitchell and Keilbach argue that because of the nature of externalities, 
environmental agreements attempting to mitigate them do not always have access to some 
methods of inducing enforcement, such as restricting membership, or responding to defection by 
reciprocal defection.  For example, restricting polluters from membership to an institution 
designed to reduce the externality of water pollution, or increasing water pollution when other 
members do so are not available options to states attempting to enforce environmental 
agreements, as neither action would help either state achieve its goals of cooperation. 31  
However, Mitchell and Keilbach dig deeper into the nuances of externalities, 
distinguishing between symmetric externalities, where the states involved are both victims and 
perpetrators, and asymmetric externalities, where “upstream” states are perpetrators of the 
externality, and “downstream” states are either victims of, or just generally dissatisfied with, the 
externality.32  They argue that whether or not the externality is symmetric or asymmetric affects 
the incentives for states to defect, and thus influences the design of the institutional response.33 
 While issue-specific reciprocity is often both a rational response to defection and an 
important enforcement mechanism used in other issues areas, reciprocity has limited utility in 
environmental agreements attempting to mitigate externalities.  If the externality is symmetric, it 
is possible that reciprocity might be the preferred method of enforcement because it avoids 
                                                 
31 Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 132. 
32 Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 131. 
33 Ibid., 139. 
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confronting problems of distribution, but only if the negative effects of reciprocally violating the 
agreement can be targeted at the original violator.34  However, if violating an agreement creates 
large harms “on a diffuse set of actors, as often occurs in environmental affairs, retaliatory 
noncompliance will be unlikely.”35 
 However, issue specific reciprocity does not work for asymmetric externalities because, 
according to Mitchell and Keilbach, “perpetrators receive no benefits if dissatisfied states 
cooperate, [which] means perpetrators have no reason to join. Second, perpetrators are not 
harmed if dissatisfied states defect…[which means] perpetrators who join have no reason to 
comply.”36 For these reasons, when confronting asymmetric externalities, “states must expand 
institutional scope in ways that induce perpetrators to join while reassuring dissatisfied states that 
the perpetrators will comply.”37  States can do so by “linking” the problem of the externality to 
other issues, and then either employing coercion or rewards to alter the incentives of polluting 
states.38 
 Yet Mitchell and Keilbach go even further in their analysis, illustrating that when 
confronting asymmetric externalities, whether or not states use coercion or rewards when they 
extend an agreements scope “depends on the relative power of the perpetrator.”39  While in 
situations when the victims of an asymmetric externality are more powerful than the perpetrators, 
the victims could just threaten the perpetrators to address the externality, yet weak victims are 
forced to choose between offering rewards to the perpetrators or “suffering what they must.”40  
This situation structure makes mitigating some externalities very difficult, since, as will be 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 140 
35 Ibid., 141 
36 Ibid., 142 
37 Ibid., 142 
38 Ibid., 142, 156. 
39 Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 142. 
40 Ibid., 142-143. 
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discussed later, many perpetrators of global externalities are powerful states, and many victims 
are weak, with little to offer in terms of rewards. 
Two-Level Games 
 Yet another difficulty facing environmental treaties is the presence of two-level games.  
While most international treaties are negotiated on the state level, with the states as bargaining 
agents, state (as a conceptual whole) is not always the only actor involved in the activities 
relevant to the treaty.  The other actors—which may be citizens, the legislative body or special 
interests of a nation, a corporation or another relevant organization—all have incentives that 
would affect the ultimate outcome of the treaty as well. According to Putnam, the dilemma is 
that “central decision-makers (‘the state’) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and 
international pressures.”41  Because of the nature of these two-level games, what might be a 
rational course of action for a national political leader in the international game might not be 
rational in the domestic level of the game, yet leaders ultimately need to satisfy both for the 
agreement to succeed.42 
Two-level games can be a significant barrier to cooperation while actually negotiating 
and concluding the treaty, or they can be barriers to the treaty’s ultimate effectiveness.  However, 
in some cases, the presence of a two-level game might also be beneficial by giving state 
negotiators more leverage or political will to create substantive environmental agreements.  In 
any of those cases, however, two-level games significantly add to the complexity of the process.   
 Robert Putnam is one scholar who argues for the importance of two-level games in 
international relations by analyzing the role two-level games have in the negotiation and 
ratification process.  Putnam criticizes paradigms that evaluate “state strength” as a key 
                                                 
41 Putnam 1988, 431. 
42 Putnam 1988, 434. 
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determinant in foreign policy or that focus too intently on the unitary actor model  because they 
implicitly assume that the governing coalition does not matter, since states have the same 
strength no matter who is running them.43  Putnam argues that such a focus is not useful, since 
“state strength” or unitary actor models are ill-suited to explain changes over time, since “state 
structures” stay relatively the same. 44  Putnam also argues that even without considering 
legislative bodies or other domestic interests, there is rarely consensus within the executive 
branch of a country as to what course of action is in the “national interest.”45 
 Instead, Putnam argues for the importance of “win-sets,” the set of possible agreements 
which “gain the necessary support among constituents” to be ratified by the country negotiating 
the agreement (Putnam is careful to clarify that this does not just hold true for democracies, but 
“constituents” or “votes” could be classified as any other sort of institutional interest, such as the 
military).46  He argues that concluding international agreements depends on finding a treaty 
which will satisfy the win-sets of both countries, and thus ultimately be ratified by both. 
 Because of the complexity of the domestic facet of negotiation, Putnam also makes an 
important distinction between “voluntary” and “involuntary” defection during the process of a 
two-level game (by “defection” he refers not to an action of disobeying the treaty after it has 
been signed, but rather of negotiating a treaty which is then not ratified).47   “Voluntary” 
defection refers to a situation when a state rejects an offer or a negotiated treaty because the 
negotiator does not agree with its terms.  “Involuntary” defection, however, is when a state 
rejects or refuses to ratify a treaty not because it does not agree with the terms, but because it 
does not satisfy domestic interests.  Because of the possibility of an involuntary defection after a 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 437. 
44 Ibid., 434. 
45 Ibid., 432. 
46 Putnam 1988, 437. 
47 Ibid., 438-439. 
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negotiation, “in any two-level game, the credibility of official commitment may be low, even if 
the reputational effects of reneging may be high, for the negotiator may be unable to guarantee 
ratification.”48 
 However, the reason this reality is especially significant during negotiations is because 
the size of each country’s win-set—the amount of different agreements that would be accepted 
domestically—affects the distribution of gains from the cooperation.  However, because 
negotiators of international agreements are often “badly misinformed” about domestic politics 
abroad, states have an incentive to misrepresent the size of their domestic win-sets in order to 
reach an agreement that is more favorable to their state.49  States can do so by camouflaging 
voluntary defection as involuntary, saying things like, “I would love to concede that point, but 
my electorate would never approve it if I did.”50  While this is a bargaining advantage for states 
with powerful domestic interests, like the United States, it limits the scope of cooperation, and 
thus, the possibility for agreement.51   As Putnam describes, “the smaller the win-sets, the greater 
the risk of involuntary defection, and hence the more applicable the literature about dilemmas of 
collective action.”52  In environmental agreements where the participation of many states is 
required, this misrepresentation of win-sets could actually prevent successful cooperation. 
 The process of constructing win-sets can also become interactive if the issue is 
politicized.  If an issue is politicized and in the public eye, domestic attention can either shrink or 
expand the size of the win-set, depending on whether or not there are differences in domestic 
opinion.  If there are domestic differences, negotiation can initiate what Putnam terms “suasive 
reverberation,” when “messages from abroad can change minds, move the undecided, and 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 439. 
49 Ibid., 439-440, 452-453. 
50 Putnam 1988, 438. 
51 Ibid., 448. 
52 Ibid., 439. 
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hearten those in the domestic minority.”53  This has been especially apparent in the climate 
change debate, as international statements and action have motivated some cities and other 
politicians in the domestic minority to attempt to comply with Kyoto Protocol despite the refusal 
of the United States government to sign the agreement. 
 Politicization can also change incentives for politicians and negotiators of agreements.  
Putnam describes how concluding an agreement brings “transaction benefits” in terms of 
domestic support for leaders, and leaders have an incentive to help each other gain approval 
domestically.  Because of this incentive, leaders sometimes cooperate weakly so as to reap the 
transaction benefits while avoiding the transaction costs.  Putnam’s prime example of this is the 
Western summit, which place “greater emphasis on publicity than on substance.”54  
It could be argued that the historical lack of international action to address climate 
change, as well as other environmental issues, is the incentive structure for politicians.  While 
climate change (and other environmental issues) are important long term issues, other political 
actions have much higher potential to advance their career, and not as many risks.  A politician 
who negotiates a climate change treaty will have to bear the costs of such an agreement almost 
instantly, while the benefits will not be readily apparent until much later—probably, at least in 
the case of the heads of democratic states at least—until well after they have left their positions.  
While some organizations have tried to alter the incentives for politicians to address climate 
change by mobilizing public opinion, multinationals of oil, gas, cars, and chemicals have 
influence and employ public relations agents to convince people that climate change does not 
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exist or is not a threat. 55  This battle constantly creates an unpredictable political climate for 
politicians. 
 Yet two-level games are not confined to the negotiation and ratification stage, but rather 
are also often present in the enforcement and compliance stage of the agreement, especially in 
the case of international environmental agreements.  These two-level games are usually between 
the government and its citizens, or the government and industry.  I like to think of these specific 
types of two-level games as problems of “limited influence.”  In these games, while the 
government may intend to comply with an agreement, it cannot guarantee compliance because 
actors at the domestic level have incentives to defect.   
James Morrow examines an example of this type of two-level game in Prisoner of War 
treaties.  As Morrow describes, “an effective agreement on POWs must operate on the individual 
level as well as on the state level,” since a prisoner’s greatest risk of death is before it reaches the 
enemy camp, in the hands of one individual soldier during the act of surrender.56  As Morrow 
further elaborates, “upholding treatment standards is costly for the detaining power, so it is 
tempting for states to cheat.”57  This incentive structure often occurs within environmental 
agreements.  One example of this would be an environmental treaty which prescribes that a 
Central American country protect its rainforests in exchange for technology.  While the country’s 
government may attempt to enforce such an agreement, peasants without land or food have an 
incentive to cut down the rainforest to grow crops, and small businessmen have an incentive to 
log the forests for lucrative timber.  
Two-level game problems are a key barrier to the effectiveness in many environmental 
agreements, as well as human rights agreements, and serve to obscure whether or not a state is 
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complying with an agreement.  After all, states could claim to have little influence over its 
domestic actors, yet really endorse what they are doing, or be legitimately attempting to enforce 
the agreement, with only limited success. 
Why the North-South Divide Deserves Special Attention 
 While the special considerations for sovereignty, the scientific uncertainty, the unique 
participation and enforcement challenges, and the two-level games present in environmental 
treaties make them worthy of special attention within the study of international cooperation, the 
implications of the vast disparities between the countries of the North and the countries of the 
South are equally deserving of special attention within the realm of environmental cooperation.  
As more and more international environmental challenges require global cooperation in order to 
be effective, bridging the North-South divide—a divide that is not only a political divide, but one 
of power, amount of pollution, influence, living standards and ideology—may well become the 
crucial factor which decides whether or not environmental cooperation is successful.  Yet 
bridging the divide requires confronting several factors that significantly exacerbate already 
challenging barriers to cooperation.  
Extreme Asymmetry of Power, Pollution and Living Standards 
According to John Vogler, any institution meant to govern the global commons must take 
into account “an international political and economic system marked by extreme inequalities and 
which the relationship between developed market economies and less developed countries 
(LDCs) is often more one of dominance and dependence than interdependence.”58  Indeed, the 
military, economic, and political power of the Northern countries towers over those of the South. 
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Economically, besides lacking the market influence the North has, the countries of the 
South are also restricted by significant amounts of debt from the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank from money that was lend to them in order to carry out “structural 
adjustment” programs.  While these programs have now been condemned for increasing poverty 
and environmental degradation in many countries of the South, the debt these countries have 
from structural adjustment programs remain, and those countries need to earn money to pay off 
their debts.59 Furthermore, the structure of the global market favors the economies of the North 
over those of the South.  For example, many countries of the South that export luxury crops, like 
sugar or coffee, have a strong dependence on market fluctuations.  Furthermore, agricultural 
protectionism by the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) limits other agricultural opportunities for these countries to free themselves from their 
debt to the IMF and the World Bank. 60 
Yet besides an asymmetry of political, economic, and military power, there also exists an 
asymmetry of pollution and the use of natural resources between these two groups of states.  
While which group of states are “upstream” and “downstream” often varies by issue area—
within the issue of biodiversity, for example, Northern states are often considered “downstream,” 
since most of the world’s biodiversity is concentrated the tropics and could be lucratively 
exploited for economic gain by Southern countries—Northern countries, in general, have 
economies based on industrial operations, and as such, they generate the vast majority of global 
air and water pollution, as well as many substances responsible for anthropogenic climate 
change.  This asymmetry of pollution is significant because, according to Mitchell and Keilbach, 
“asymmetric situations create greater enforcement problems precisely because they involve 
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unidirectional dependence rather than reciprocal interdependence.”61  Furthermore, the North has 
many more resources that enable it to isolate itself (at least in the short term) from the effects of 
many forms of pollution, but climate change especially.  By contrast, the countries of the South 
depend much more immediately on agriculture and other methods of harvesting natural 
resources, and are much more vulnerable to and less able to adapt to the effects of environmental 
crises like soil depletion and climate change. 
 There is also a pronounced asymmetry of consumption and living standards.  In Northern 
countries, most citizens do not worry about satisfying their basic needs, but rather about their 
relative level of consumption, unlike many citizens in Southern countries, who often lack access 
to clean water, access to adequate health care, food and other basic needs.  Furthermore, the level 
of consumption in the North is unsustainable.  If the entire world consumed and produced the 
quantity of goods that are already produced in the industrialized nations, the human race would 
need more or less ten times the resources that exist in all of the world—in other words, the world 
population would need another nine Earths. 62    
The asymmetry of consumption and living standards is becoming more salient at the 
moment because a significant amount of countries, especially in Asia, are industrializing at a 
rapid rate, and the world population continues to grow. 63 64  The combination of unsustainable 
consumption patterns and rapid industrialization by developing countries led the world to a 
moral, political, social, economic, and environmental conundrum right before the turn of the 
millennium: should world leaders steward the environment, leaving billions of people to extreme 
poverty, or overexploit the Earth’s resources, potentially crippling the Earth permanently and 
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compromising future generations ability to survive in order to elevate the standard of living for 
all the citizens of the world today? 
In 1983, the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland 
Commission), attempted to resolve this conundrum with the concept of sustainable development, 
explained in their report, titled Our Common Future. 65 The concept of sustainable development 
is development that meets the needs of the present generation without sacrificing the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 66 However, the implementation of sustainable 
development has been much more elusive than its ideological foundation—even today, no good 
example of sustainable development exists, because the “developed” countries industrialized in 
an unsustainable way.67  This fact has led to the realization that world consumption patterns must 
be altered.  The subsequent question, however, “who is going to decrease or restrict their level of 
consumption and pollution?” presents a severe distribution problem. 
Dueling Ideologies 
Complicating this distribution problem are dueling ideologies struggling for prominence 
in the codification of international laws and norms.  Any answer to the question of who should 
bear the costs of environmental protection—whether they be costs incurred by restricting 
production, restricting consumption, paying for new technologies, or whatever other measures 
become necessary—is inextricably linked with an inevitably controversial rationale of why any 
such entity should pay those costs.  While the answer to “who will pay what” may be the most 
politically important in the short term, the answer to “why such-and-such country should and will 
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pay such-and-such” amount will most likely have a much longer lasting effects on international 
environmental cooperation. 
An interesting example of this ideological clash is illustrated in Duncan French’s 
“Developing States and International Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities.”68  
French describes the conflict over the wording Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, an agreement 
that is not legally binding, but ideologically significant in determining international legal norms. 
The debate centered on the legal responsibility of developed states for past environmental 
damage, sometimes referred to as the concept of “ecological debt.” 
The concept of ecological debt is based on the fact that many of the ecological problems 
that exist today are linked to the historical and economic processes of the development and 
industrialization of the North.  Much of the environmental impacts that are now “passing safe 
thresholds” have accumulated since England’s industrial revolution.69   Because of this, many 
countries of the South which are now industrializing, like China, are of the opinion that this 
historic monopolization of the Earth’s ability to absorb pollution and use of natural resources by 
the developed countries constitutes an ecological debt that they owe the world, through the 
transfer of funds or technology.70  In an attempt to codify this ideology, the G77 group of 
developing states proposed the following wording for Principle 7:  
 
“In view of their main historical and current responsibility for global environmental 
degradation and their capability to address this common concern, developed countries 
shall provide adequate, new and additional financial resources and environmentally 
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sound technologies on preference and concessional terms to developing countries to 
enable them to achieve sustainable development.”71 (Emphasis added) 
 
This wording would make Northern countries legally responsible for historical damage, and 
technological and financial assistance imperative.  The use of the phrase “shall provide” is also 
strong prescriptive wording. 
 The above Principle 7 as proposed by the G77, however, was not the agreed upon text.  
Northern countries disagreed with the notion of legal responsibility for past actions, and asserted 
that the different responsibilities of the North and South should be based on future responsibility 
for achieving sustainable development:  
“The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility they bear in the international 
pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.”72  
Even though the agreement was not binding, the United States was still concerned about the 
wording of even this version of the final Principle 7 and so issued an interpretive statement 
asserting that the principle did not absolve developing countries from ecological responsibility, 
but acknowledged a special leadership role for developed countries because of their resources.73  
The attention paid to agreements that are admittedly “only” ideological highlights the gravity 
with which the environmental concerns within the context of the North-South divide are 
addressed in the international arena. 
Hypotheses 
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Because of the potential of the North-South divide to significantly exacerbate cooperation 
problems, especially distribution problems, enforcement problems, and uncertainty about 
preferences, following the logic of the Rational Design framework, there should be significant 
differences in the design of treaties that are exclusively between Northern countries, treaties that 
are exclusively between Southern countries, and treaties that are between both countries of the 
North and countries of the South.   
With this basic assumption, it is possible to formulate some basic hypotheses about the 
design differences that should be present between groups given the strategic cooperation 
problems each group faces.  Below are the hypotheses I will attempt to test in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There will be few, if any South/South agreements. 
Because of the vast quality living standards and low per capita gross national income, 
Southern countries have many more immediate, domestic human concerns to confront than 
spend precious resources on the transaction costs associated with negotiating environmental 
agreements with few prospects of receiving the economic or technological benefits that would be 
possible in an agreement with Northern countries.   
 
Hypothesis 2: North/South agreements will be relatively inflexible, while North/North 
agreements will be relatively flexible. 
Mitchell and Keilbach assert that states use flexibility in agreements if it allows them to 
win short-term benefits while avoiding long-term risks, however, in situations where gains from 
cooperation require both sides to execute the exact terms of the agreement, flexibility is not a 
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welcome tool.74  Following this logic, because of the asymmetric nature of the North/South 
relationship as well as widespread skepticism and uncertainty about preferences, North/South 
agreements can be expected to be inflexible.  North/North agreements, on the other hand, 
because they have the resources to bear the transaction costs associated with increased flexibility, 
should be expected to be flexible in order to counter uncertainty about the state about the world 
and the arrival of new scientific knowledge. 
 
Hypothesis 3: North/North agreements will be relatively narrow in scope, while 
North/South agreements will be wide, linking to other issues. 
Because of the asymmetry of the externalities many North/South agreements would 
attempt to address this asymmetry by widening the scope of the agreement in order to alter the 
incentive structure, as described by Mitchell and Keilbach.75  This hypothesis is also based on 
the rationale behind the Rational Design conjecture “scope increases with the severity of the 
distribution problem.”76  Because many North/North agreements are characterized by symmetric 
externalities, issue-specific reciprocity will most likely be an option, and thus a narrower scope 
can be expected relative to the North/South agreements. 
 
Hypothesis 4: North/South agreements will use some type of inducements to compliance 
(either coercion or rewards). 
 This hypothesis follows logically from hypothesis three, which anticipates wider scopes 
for North/South agreements.  Once again, because of the asymmetric relationship between the 
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North and the South, which aggravates enforcement problems, some sort of coercion or 
exchange should be expected in order to induce compliance from contracting states. 
 
Hypothesis 5: North/North agreements will rely on mainly decentralized compliance 
monitoring, such as self-reporting or a fire alarm system, while North/South agreements 
will rely mainly on centralized compliance monitoring, such as a Police Patrol.  
Because Northern countries are linked by strong trade ties and are also significantly more 
powerful than Southern countries, they will be less likely to submit themselves to compliance 
monitoring by a centralized body, and will instead rely on decentralized mechanisms that will 
allow each state to report each other.  In contrast, North/South agreements, will defer to 
centralized compliance monitoring because of the large degree of mistrust regarding 
environmental agreements between the North and the South, as well as limited resources of 
many countries of the South to individually monitor other countries. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Non-state actors should be heavily involved in North/South agreements.  
 Because of the combination of high levels of distrust between Northern and Southern 
countries, as well as the need for trustworthy independent monitors and unbiased scientific 
research to confront scientific uncertainty, non-state actors should be expected to be very 
involved in North/South agreements. 
 
Hypothesis 7: North/North agreements will be characterized by restrictive membership. 
Because membership within environmental treaties is dependent on the nature of the 
environmental issue, and many externalities are symmetric among countries of the North, it can 
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be expected that North/North agreements will be characterized by restrictive membership, 
perhaps using established political connections to complete agreements with close trade partners. 
 
Descriptive Research Questions 
 Besides these specific hypotheses, I will also attempt to answer the following descriptive 
questions about the sample: 
¾ Is there a difference in the complexity of the cooperation problems addressed in each of 
the three groups?  
¾ Is there a difference between the use of hard law and soft law between the three groups?  
¾ Is there a difference between the amount of precision between the three groups?  
¾ Is there a difference in how symmetric/asymmetric agreements are between groups?  
¾ Is there a difference between whether or not domestic legislation is required between 
groups?  
Methodology 
In an attempt not only to test these hypotheses but to answer these descriptive research 
questions, this study employs a quantitative analysis of a random sample of twenty-four 
environmental treaties from the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), as part of the Professor 
Barbara Koremenos’ National Science Foundation sponsored project on the Continent of 
International Law.  The United Nations Treaty Series is a collection of all the international 
agreements registered with the United Nations Secretariat since World War II until December 
1986, with some agreements from earlier.  The sample was chosen from a random ordering of all 
the environmental treaties in the UNTS.  This unbiased sample will allows for scientific and 
systematic analysis of the patterns of treaty design.  Within the sample, treaties were classified as 
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into one of three categories depending on the countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty: 
treaties in which the parties are exclusively Northern states (North/North treaties), treaties which 
the parties are exclusively Southern states(South/South treaties), and treaties in which the parties 
are both Northern and Southern states(North/South treaties).  These groups are analyzed as 
independent variables, since, following the logic of Rational Design theory, the different 
challenges each group presents should result in different patterns of treaty design. 
The dependent variables for the random sample were the specific design features of each 
agreement, such as articles prohibiting reservations or compliance monitoring provisions.  Each 
of these agreements were coded separately by two independent coders.  After each completed the 
coding separately, the different coding protocols were compared.  Any differences between the 
two codings were discussed, and a final decision was reached by Professor Barbara Koremenos. 
Defining the North/South Distinction 
By far the most difficult variable to operationalize was the distinction between “North” 
and “South” within the random sample.  The terms “developed” and “developing,” as well as 
“North” and “South,” are often used in political discussions as general, blanket terms; however, 
when it comes to operationalizing these concepts, there is little agreement among sources.  While 
the United Nations addresses the concept of developed and developing in many of its 
publications, “there is no established convention for the designation of ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries within the United Nations system.”77  Much of the uncertainty and debate 
stems from the ambiguity of the concept of development: is it per capita GNP? Is it quality of 
life? Is it industrialization?  In an attempt to accommodate all of these different characterizations 
of development, as well as eliminate any bias arising from favoring one particular interpretation 
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over another, I cross-checked each treaty in the sample with several different measures to 
determine how to classify it. 
Since one traditional view of development is economic wealth per capita, the first 
classification tool I used was the World Bank’s country classification table, which ranks 
countries by gross national income (GNI) per capita.78  Using this classification, countries 
classified as high-income and members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development were considered Northern, while any other countries were considered Southern.  
Using the distinction of countries that were high income and members of OECD avoided the 
problem of including rich island countries that are highly dependent on the tourism industry, 
countries which, although they have high incomes, share many more interests with the countries 
of the South.  
The second classification tool I used was the Human Development Index (HDI), a 
composite index created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) combining a 
country’s life expectancy at birth, its adult literacy rates and school enrollment levels, and its 
gross domestic product per capita.  The Human Development Index was created to address not 
only the income or wealth of a country, but how much that wealth was invested into each 
country’s citizens.  This index avoids the pitfalls of relying simply on GNI per capita, which, 
especially in countries in which oil or tourism are the principle source of GNI, ignores the actual 
living conditions and opportunities within the country.  The UNDP considers any country with 
an HDI of .800 or above to have a “high level of development,” thus, any country with an HDI of 
.800 and above at the time the treaty was signed was considered a Northern country, while any 
country with less than .800 HDI was considered a Southern country.  Because HDI information 
                                                 
78United Nations: World Banks List of Economies. 2007 
 33
was only available as far back as 1975, agreements concluded earlier than 1975 used the 1975 
values, assuming relative stasis for the country. 
The third classification I cross-checked was the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s (UNCTAD) 2005 Handbook of Statistics, which lists the economies it considers 
“developed.”79  The members of the G77 group of developing states were also considered when 
different classification tools contradicted each other, since joining the G77 is a political symbol 
of shared interests with countries of the South.  
Surprisingly enough, there were few contradictions within the classification of treaties.  
In the large majority of treaties, using the World Bank classification, the Human Development 
Index, the UNCTAD classification and the G77 membership yielded concurring results.  The 
exceptions, the treaties in which different measurements contradicted each other, were all treaties 
that involved the membership of an Eastern European country, or former members of the Soviet 
Union.  Even thought the Human Development Indexes of these countries were often below the 
established threshold for “high human development” and their incomes were not high enough to 
be considered “Northern” using the World Bank’s data, for the purposes of this study, Eastern 
European countries were considered Northern countries for a several reasons: 1) many of them 
have an advanced industrial infrastructure and have followed a distinctly different development 
path from other Southern countries,80 2) the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development lists them among the few “developed” countries, and 3) these countries did not join 
the G-77, indirectly indicating that they do not perceive their interests to be in line with other 
countries of the South. 
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After the three groups have been established, the data from relevant agreement provisions 
was analyzed with cross-tab analysis, and the p-values for each provision were also calculated.  
When possible, correlation coefficients were also calculated.  However, to control for the special 
circumstances of Eastern European countries and ensure that their unique situation did not skew 
the results of the quantitative analysis, the data was calculated twice for each provision: once, 
including all of the treaties, and a second time, excluding the six treaties involving Eastern 
European countries that had contradictory classifications. 
 35
Results 
  
While the quantitative results of the sample are only statistically significant in a few 
instances, the distribution of treaties and provisions within the treaties is significant enough in 
places to pique interest in asking similar questions with a large sample size.  Because of this lack 
of statistical significance, hypotheses can neither be proven, nor completely disregarded. 
Hypothesis 1: South/South Agreements 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be few, if any South/South agreements.  This 
hypothesis was validated by the sample.  Of the twenty-four random agreements studied, only 
one of them could be classified as South/South.  Furthermore, the agreement was between 
Argentina and Chile, two of the wealthier and arguably more “developed” Southern countries. 
Hypothesis 2: Flexibility 
Hypothesis 2 stated that North/South agreements will be relatively inflexible, while 
North/North agreements will be relatively flexible.  The presence (or, inversely, the absence) of 
several provisions were examined to determine the flexibility or rigidity of each type of 
cooperation: “opt out” provisions, renegotiation or modification provisions, amendment 
provisions, escape clauses, and provisions prohibiting reservations.  None of the provisions 
varied predictably enough within each cooperation group enough to be statistically significant, so 
largely this dataset failed to reject the null hypothesis, that there is no systematic variation in 
flexibility between North/North cooperation and North/South cooperation.  However, what the 
sample does seem to support is that there is little flexibility within environmental agreements in 
general. 
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The tables below represent the spread of agreements with “opt out” provisions, 
provisions which let parties to the agreement decide not to be bound by other specific provisions 
within the treaty.  
 
Does the agreement contain 
certain provisions that members 
are not obligated to sign or comply 
with (an opt out clause)? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Does the agreement contain 
certain provisions that members 
are not obligated to sign or comply 
with (an opt out clause)? 
(Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 1 8 North/South 1 7 
North/North 0 14 North/North 0 9 
p-value: .202 
Correlation coefficient: -.6363 
p-value: .274 
Correlation coefficient: -.5625 
 
As is evident above, none of the environmental treaties had opt out clauses except for 
one, a multilateral North/South agreement, the International Convention for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas.  The opt out clause in this agreement allowed states to not be bound by binding 
recommendations of the treaty’s internal body if they object to them within a designated period. 
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The next provision examined was the renegotiation, or modification provision, which 
stipulates a process for the modification of the treaty.  The following are the results for this 
specific provision. 
Does the agreement have a 
renegotiation or modification 
provision? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Does the agreement have a 
renegotiation or modification 
provision? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 2 7 North/South 2 6 
North/North 3 11 North/North 3 6 
p-value: .964 
Correlation coefficient: -.0111 
p-value: .707 
Correlation coefficient: .1000 
 
While these results are especially statistically insignificant with regards to the differences 
between North/North and North/South cooperation, it is interesting to note that the statistical 
significance of that difference increased by more than twenty-five percent after the exclusion of 
the Eastern European countries with this particular provision.  Furthermore, it is curious that a 
little over one fifth of the entire sample had renegotiation provisions. 
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Another measure of institutional flexibility is the ability to amend an agreement, and the 
presence of amendment provisions within the three cooperation groups is displayed below. 
Is there an amendment provision? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Is there an amendment provision? 
(Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 4 5 North/South 3 5 
North/North 5 9 North/North 2 7 
p-value: .675 
Correlation coefficient: -.0873 
p-value: .490 
Correlation coefficient: -.1833 
 
Like those of the negotiation provisions discussed above, these p-values are statistically 
insignificant, but once again, that significance improved by over twenty-five percent when the 
agreements that focus on Eastern European countries are excluded.  It is also interesting to note 
that a higher proportion of North/South agreements had amendment provisions than North/North 
agreements.  This would seem to (tentatively) suggest the opposite from my hypothesis, that 
North/South treaties are more flexible than North/North treaties. 
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Escape clauses also provide flexibility, since escape clauses allow participants to 
“escape” from the agreement temporarily under extenuating circumstances, then rejoin 
afterwards without penalty.  The results for escape clauses are found below. 
Does the agreement contain an 
escape clause? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Does the agreement contain an 
escape clause? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 1 8 North/South 1 7 
North/North 0 14 North/North 0 9 
p-value: .202 
Correlation coefficient: -.6363 
p-value: .274 
Correlation coefficient: -.5625 
 
Generalizing from the above tables, it would seem that environmental treaties do not use 
escape clauses often.  The one agreement that does contain an escape clause was a multilateral, 
North/South agreement, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil.  The agreement prescribes where vessels can get rid of oil and other damaging substances 
within the sea.  The escape clause within this particular agreement gives states the ability to 
suspend its compliance with the amendment in the case of war.   
 While the presence of amendment provisions, escape clauses, opt out clauses and 
renegotiation provisions are examples of flexibility, the presence of a provision prohibiting 
reservations marks a more rigid treaty which does not allow states to object to parts of the 
agreement and still be a participant.  The results for provisions prohibiting reservations are 
illustrated in the tables on the next page. 
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Is there a provision prohibiting 
reservations? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Is there a provision prohibiting 
reservations? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 1 8 North/South 1 7 
North/North 0 14 North/North 0 9 
p-value: .202 
Correlation coefficient: -.6363 
p-value: .274 
Correlation coefficient: -.5625 
 
Like escape clauses, the evidence seems to suggest that provisions prohibiting 
reservations are not common among environmental treaties, since only one treaty had a provision 
prohibiting reservations.  That treaty was a multilateral, North/South treaty: the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 
Hypothesis 3: Scope 
Hypothesis 3 stated that North/North agreements will be relatively narrow in scope, while 
North/South agreements will be wide, linking to other issues.  Surprisingly, only one agreement 
was coded as being “multi-issue.”  This agreement was a bilateral North/South agreement, 
between one of the richest countries in the world, the Federal Republic of Germany, and one of 
the poorest, Sierra Leone.  Only one other agreement in the sample, one between the United 
States and Sudan, is a bilateral agreement that crosses such a great wealth divide.  Furthermore, 
the p-values for both samples, while not statistically significant, are not so high as to be 
dismissed, given the small sample size.  Thus, evaluating this hypothesis fully will require more 
thorough empirical testing, with a larger sample size. 
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Is this a one-issue agreement or a 
multi-issue agreement? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Is this a one-issue agreement or a 
multi-issue agreement? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 One-Issue 
Multi-
Issue  One-Issue 
Multi-
Issue 
North/South 8 1 North/South 7 1 
North/North 14 0 North/North 9 0 
p-value: .202 
Correlation coefficient: -.6363 
p-value: .274 
Correlation coefficient: -.5625 
 
Hypothesis 4: Inducements to Compliance 
Hypothesis 4 stated that North/South agreements will use some type of inducements to 
compliance, either coercion or rewards.  The tables on the next page describe whether or not 
agreements established inducements to compliance.  While it is not statistically significant, these 
p-values are relatively lower than many others in this study, and a larger proportion of 
North/South agreements used inducements to compliance.  Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
that none of the agreements that focused on countries of Eastern Europe established inducements 
to compliance. 
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 Does the agreement establish 
inducements to compliance? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Does the agreement establish 
inducements to compliance? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 3 6 North/South 3 5 
North/North 1 13 North/North 1 8 
p-value: .106 
Correlation coefficient: -.4342 
p-value: .200 
Correlation coefficient: -.3653 
 
Only one agreement, however, clearly stipulated which inducements to compliance 
would be used, and those were punishments, in the International Convention for Prevention of 
the Sea by Oil, the multilateral North/South agreement discussed earlier as the only agreement 
with an escape clause.  In another treaty, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas, another multilateral North/South agreement also discussed 
earlier as the only agreement prohibiting reservations, signatories found to be non-compliant 
were simply told they must comply but not punished.  While nothing can conclusively be gained 
from this limited result, the results nonetheless tentatively support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Monitoring 
Hypothesis 5 states that North/North agreements will rely on mainly decentralized 
compliance monitoring, such as self-reporting or a fire alarm system, while North/South 
agreements will rely mainly on centralized compliance monitoring, such as a Police Patrol.  The 
following table first examines the existence of systems of compliance monitoring within the 
samples.  While there are not significant differences between the two types of cooperation, it is 
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interesting to note that a larger proportion of the environmental treaties in both samples did not 
call for a system of compliance monitoring. 
 
Does the agreement call for a 
system of compliance monitoring? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Does the agreement call for a 
system of compliance monitoring? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 4 5 North/South 3 5 
North/North 4 10 North/North 2 7 
p-value: .435 
Correlation coefficient: -.1666 
p-value: .490 
Correlation coefficient: -.1833 
 
 The next table, on the following page, examines whether there is a difference in when 
monitoring occurs—on a regular basis, such as with a “police patrol” or with “self-reporting,” or 
when there are allegations of noncompliance.  Not only is this data not significant, but contrary 
to most other provisions, the significance of the data declined by over fifty percent after the 
exclusion of the Eastern European country treaties.   
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 Does monitoring occur on a regular basis, 
only when there are allegations of non-
compliance, or both? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Does monitoring occur on a regular 
basis, only when there are allegations of 
non-compliance, or both? 
(Exclusive Sample) 
 
Regular 
Basis 
Only With 
Allegations Both  
Regular 
Basis 
Only With 
Allegations Both 
North/ 
South 2 0 2 
North/ 
South 1 0 2 
North/ 
North 3 0 1 
North/ 
North 1 0 1 
p-value: .465 p-value: .709 
 
 However, while there is almost no significant difference between types of cooperation in 
when monitoring takes place, there is a statistically significant difference within the exclusive 
sample between the use of self-reporting and an internal body to determine compliance.  The 
results are in the tables on the next page. 
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 Who gathers and reports the data 
from which compliance/non-
compliance is determined? 
(Complete Sample) 
 Who gathers and reports the data 
from which compliance/non-
compliance is determined? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 
Self-
Reporting 
by 
Members 
An 
Internal 
Body 
 
Self-
Reporting 
by 
Members 
An 
Internal 
Body 
North/South 4 0 North/South 3 0 
North/North 1 1 North/North 0 1 
p-value: .121 p-value: .046 
 
 According to this data, North/South agreements use self-reporting by members 
exclusively, while North/North treaties are more likely to use an internal body.  This is exactly 
the opposite of my hypothesis: instead of North/South agreements using centralized monitoring 
and North/North agreements using decentralized monitoring, North/South agreements are using 
overwhelmingly decentralized monitoring while the North/North agreement uses centralized 
monitoring. 
Hypothesis 6: Non-state Actors 
Hypothesis 6 stated that Non-state actors should be heavily involved in North/South 
agreements.  Surprisingly, however, within both of these samples non-states actors were not 
involved.  In only one agreement, the multilateral North/South Convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution, were non-state actors allowed to become members of the agreement.  
Yet even more surprising was the fact that no agreements in the sample employed pre-existing 
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intergovernmental organizations or non-governmental organizations to determine whether or not 
states were complying with the agreement. 
Hypothesis 7: Membership 
Hypothesis 7 stated that North/North agreements will be characterized by restrictive 
membership.  Below are tables showing membership criteria for both samples.  Indeed, 
according to the data, North/North agreements are more restrictive in their criteria—no 
North/North agreements were simply open to all states without different categories of 
membership. 
Is membership open to all states or only to 
those that meet certain criteria? 
(Complete Sample) 
 
 
 
 
Is membership open to all states or only 
to those that meet certain criteria? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 
Only 
Those 
that 
Meet 
Criteria 
Open 
to All 
States 
Both: 
Different 
Categories of 
Member-
ship 
 
Only 
Those 
that 
Meet 
Criteria 
Open to 
All 
States 
Both: 
Different 
Categories 
of Member-
ship 
North/ 
South 2 2 0 
North/  
South 2 2 0 
North/ 
North 4 0 1 
North/ 
North 2 0 1 
p-value: .165 p-value: .233 
 
 The table on the next page takes the analysis further and asks if there are different 
categories of membership within each type of cooperation. 
 
 
Are there different categories of 
membership? 
 Are there different categories of 
membership? 
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(Complete Sample)  (Exclusive Sample) 
 Yes No  Yes No 
North/South 1 3 North/South 1 3 
North/North 2 3 North/North 2 1 
p-value: .635 
Correlation coefficient: .1470 
p-value: .270 
Correlation coefficient: .3653 
 
While once again there is not a statistically significant difference between the two types 
of cooperation, the differences became fifty-seven percent more significant after the exclusion of 
the contradictory Eastern European treaties. 
Descriptive Questions 
 There was no significant difference between the level of complexity of the cooperation 
problems between North/North and North/South treaties.  Neither was there a significant 
difference in the level of precision.  All of the treaties in the sample were coded as hard law, with 
the exception of one North/North treaty, the Agreement for the protection of migratory birds and 
birds in danger of extinction and their environment, between Australia and Japan.  All of the 
agreements were coded as “symmetric,” in terms of rights and responsibilities given by each 
agreement, with the exception of two North/North treaties.   
 There was one significant surprise, however, in the form of domestic legislation.  The 
differences between how explicit an agreement was about domestic legislation were statistically 
significant between each type of cooperation, with p-values below .05, in both the complete and 
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exclusive tests of the sample, with North/South agreements being more explicit than North/North 
agreements.  The results are in the tables below. 
 
How explicit is the agreement about 
domestic legislation? 
(Complete Sample) 
 
 
 
 
How explicit is the agreement about 
domestic legislation? 
 (Exclusive Sample) 
 
Not at 
All 
Explicit 
Some-
what 
Explicit 
Explicit  
Not at 
All 
Explicit 
Some-
what 
Explicit 
Explicit 
North/ 
South 3 6 0 
North/  
South 3 5 0 
North/ 
North 12 2 0 
North/ 
North 8 1 0 
South/ 
South 
0 1 0 South/ 
South 
0 1 0 
p-value: .017 p-value: .041 
 
Discussion 
  
While the data from this analysis says (and does not say) many interesting things, there 
are three results that stand out among the rest: 1) the statistically significant difference between 
North/North treaties and North/South treaties in their use of centralized or decentralized 
compliance monitoring; 2) the statistically significant difference between the use of domestic 
legislation between North/North treaties and North/South treaties; and 3) the dramatic change in 
significance between the sample which included treaties focused on Eastern European countries 
and the sample that excluded them. 
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 The rationale for my hypothesis that North/South treaties would use centralized 
monitoring was based on the idea that the lack of trust with regards to environmental treaties 
would make both sides distrustful of the other, which would lead to centralized monitoring.  
However, it is possible that that same mistrust would lead states to mistrust any internal body 
created by an agreement, especially, in the case of Southern countries, that internal body would 
most likely be staffed by nationals of Northern countries, the countries which would have the 
resources to staff such an internal body.  Furthermore, Southern countries would be wary of 
internal bodies that could limit their sovereignty or development options.  Northern countries, on 
the other hand, might feel more comfortable with an internal body monitoring compliance 
because it decreases the incentive for states to defect by misrepresenting their environmental 
data, since many are competitors for world trade, an area that is advantaged when environmental 
standards are ignored.   
 Besides surprising differences in the centralization of compliance monitoring, the 
statistically significant differences in the degree of explicitness with regards to domestic 
legislation were also an interesting findings.  That North/South agreements were more explicit 
with regards to domestic legislation could mean that these agreements have a deeper level of 
cooperation, or perhaps less flexibility in the implementation of the treaties.  More explicitly 
requiring domestic legislation may also be an attempt to confront two-level problems, binding 
the hands of the contracting governments to extending the reach of the agreement to the 
regulation of their citizens or their industries. 
 The third particularly interesting and relevant finding of this analysis was the difference 
in p-value between the analysis of the complete sample, which included several treaties 
involving Eastern European countries, and that of the exclusive sample, which excluded those 
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treaties and analyzed only those agreements that were clearly Northern or Southern according to 
multiple classification tools.  Even though the sample size decreased by at least six treaties from 
the complete sample to the exclusive sample, the significance increased by eighteen percent on 
average, making the exclusive sample more significant despite its smaller size.  Because Eastern 
European countries have had different development paths because of their membership in the 
former Soviet Union, their political interests and development paths are distinct, not coinciding 
with either the North or the South, and thus it makes sense to exclude them from such analyses.81  
The changes in p-value from one sample to the next gives support to the importance of continued 
research on the North/South divide.  
Limitations of the Study 
 The most obvious limitation of this study is the sample size.  Because of that sample size, 
the South was forced to be analyzed as one large conglomerate, although in terms of interests it 
can feasibly be divided into many more relevant subgroups of different and sometimes 
competing interests, such as oil-producing countries, island countries, or countries with tropical 
rainforests.  The small sample size also prohibited as study of differences between environmental 
issue areas.  As each environmental issue would pose distinct barriers to successful cooperation, 
the design features of agreements should be expected to differ across environmental issue areas. 
Another limitation of this study was the time-span of the analyzed agreements.  While 
using this random sample gives credibility and integrity to the data through a rigorous 
methodological process, it detracts from the analysis in another way, since many important 
binding environmental agreements were concluded after 1986.  Furthermore, the area of 
international environmental agreements and environmental law is rapidly evolving, arguably 
                                                 
81 Rudra 2002. 
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much faster than other, more established issue areas like security and economics, and for that 
reason an analysis of earlier treaties might have only limited utility.   
 The sample also excludes treaties between states and international agents, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other organization that are important pieces 
of the environmental cooperation between North and South, and which shape the interactions 
between them.   
Another limitation of this study was also not able to take into account the increasing role 
of multinational firms, which are quickly becoming a more significant force, and sometimes 
command more power than states.  It also ignores changes in the subjective “framing” of 
political interests, or how groups come to perceive that their political goals are similar and 
related.  While the concepts of “North” and “South” are currently discussed as coherent interest 
groups, these distinctions have not always been so politically salient.  It could be argued that in a 
world divided between communism and capitalism, the idea of both the North and the South 
were lesser details in the context of the Cold War.  
Finally, although their importance was acknowledged within the theory section, the 
importance of two-level games was not fully analyzed and is deserving of much more attention.  
Furthermore, two-level games cannot by completely analyzed without significant attention to 
community and national political movements, which attempt to alter the payoff matrices of the 
politicians negotiating such agreements.  The presence or absence of such domestic political 
pressure can be expected to have significant effects on the negotiation process.   
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Concluding Thoughts 
 While this analysis has only scratched the surface of the intricacies of international 
environmental cooperation and the political difficulties of attempting to create international 
environmental agreements in the face of the great North/South divide, it has offered a glimpse of 
the hidden details yet to be discovered about global environmental cooperation, and with them, 
the keys to developing an effective environmental treaties and literally redefining the face of the 
Earth.  As our world goes forth to face such formidable global environmental challenges as 
climate change, desertification, bioaccumulation, water scarcity and pollution among many 
others, such research will only become more important. 
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Appendix:  Treaty Sample and Classifications 
 
North/North 
 
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection (Sweden and German 
Democratic Republic, UNTS #20644)* 
 
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection (U.S.A. and Japan, UNTS # 
 
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection (U.S.A. and Japan, UNTS 
#15109) 
 
Community-COST Concertation Agreement on a concerted action project in the field of analysis 
of organic micropollutants in water (Multilateral, UNTS #20754) 
 
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the free passage of salmon in Vanern 
Lake (Sweden and Norway, UNTS #14017) 
 
Agreement for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction and their 
environment (Australia and Japan, UNTS #20181) 
 
Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in earth sciences and environmental studies 
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UNTS # 19699) 
 
European Agreement on the restriction of the use of certain detergents in washing and cleaning 
products (Multilateral, UNTS #11210) 
 
Agreement concerning co-operation in the matter of plant protection (Hungary and Austria, 
UNTS #6989)* 
 
Agreement for cooperation relating to the marine environment (Denmark and Canada, UNTS 
#22693) 
 
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection (United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, UNTS #13920)* 
 
Agreement concerning the protection of the Sound Oresund from pollution (Denmark and 
Sweden, UNTS #13823) 
 
African Migratory Locust Convention (Multilateral, UNTS #10476) 
 
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts 
(Multilateral, UNTS #16710)* 
 
Convention on long-range transboundary air poolution (Multilateral, UNTS #21623)* 
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North/South 
 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation – Refuse Disposal in the Freetown Metropolitan 
Area (Federal Republic of Germany and Sierra Leone, UNTS #21678) 
 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on the project “Soil management and conservation 
East Amazonia”. (Brazil and Federal Republic of Germany, UNTS # 23031) 
 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Multilateral, UNTS 
#4714) 
 
Agreement for plant protection – Sudan quelea bird research project (U.S.A. and Sudan, UNTS 
#17308) 
 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (Multilateral, 
UNTS #8164) 
 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning land use and soil conservation in the 
eastern Amazon region (Brazil and Federal Republic of Germany, UNTS #17973) 
 
Agreement on plant protection and phytosanitary quarantine (Bulgaria and United Arab 
Republic, UNTS #9963)* 
 
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere 
(Multilateral, UNTS #485) 
 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Multilateral, UNTS 
#14097) 
 
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (Multilateral, UNTS #9587) 
 
South/South 
 
Agreement concerning the protection of frontier forests against fire (Argentina and Chile, UNTS 
#9075) 
 
 
*Denotes the agreement is excluded in the “exclusive sample” 
 
